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Abstract: Device-to-Device (D2D) communications will be used as an underlay technology in the Fifth
Generation mobile network (5G), which will make network services of multiple Service Providers
(SP) available anywhere. The end users will be allowed to access and share services using their User
Equipments (UEs), and thus they will require seamless and secured connectivity. At the same time,
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) will use the UE to offload traffic and push contents closer to
users relying on D2D communications network. This raises security concerns at different levels of the
system architecture and highlights the need for robust authentication and authorization mechanisms
to provide secure services access and sharing between D2D users. Therefore, this paper proposes a
D2D level security solution that comprises two security protocols, namely, the D2D Service security
(DDSec) and the D2D Attributes and Capability security (DDACap) protocols, to provide security for
access, caching and sharing data in network-assisted and non-network-assisted D2D communications
scenarios. The proposed solution applies Identity-based Encryption (IBE), Elliptic Curve Integrated
Encryption Scheme (ECIES) and access control mechanisms for authentication and authorization
procedures. We formally verified the proposed protocols using ProVerif and applied pi calculus. We
also conducted a security analysis of the proposed protocols.
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1. Introduction
In the Fifth Generation mobile network (5G), the end user with their User Equipment
(UE) will be able to access network services from multiple resources via new generation
Radio Access Network (ngRAN) [1], supported by various technologies. They will also
be able to cache and share the accessed services such content data with other users. There
is an immense increase in mobile usage and multimedia applications due to end users
demanding quick access to services as they are more interested in downloading, caching
and sharing content [2]. 5G promises to provide ultra-reliable low latency communications
and high availability to support mission critical services, tactile Internet and autonomous
transportation to improve users’ quality of experience and services [3–6].
5G also intends to solve limitations for peer to peer (P2P) services, as well as offloading
the data traffic from backhaul to fronthaul using P2P network such as Device-to-Device
(D2D) communications to ease the traffic burden on the 5G core network (5GC) [2]. As an
underlay technology, D2D communications will support 5G in enabling new applications
and service delivery. This will allow users to easily access proximity services (ProSe)
such as content sharing, live gaming, video streaming and offloading traffic to the edge
network [7]. In addition, D2D communications will support emergency services, vehicle to
vehicle (V2V) communication and the Internet of Things (IoT) [2]. The end users will be
involved in content-based operations through D2D communications, which will enhance
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user experience by pushing contents to the edge closer to the users [8]. The UE will act as a
data consumer as well as a helper in content distribution and delivery [9]. 5G will make
network services available anywhere from multiple Service Providers (SPs), and end users
will be allowed to access and share the services. This raises new security concerns in the
forms of securing data access and sharing that need to be addressed.
One of the challenges for Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) is to provide security
and session continuity as users access different networks and third-party services. There
is a lack of an efficient multi-purpose mechanism that addresses the authentication and
authorization of D2D users in different coverage scenarios to access services from SPs.
Moreover, there is a need of security mechanisms that allow the user to cache, share data
and delegate their access right to other users. These security solutions must consider
security at the network, service and D2D levels in 5G [2]. Federated authentication and
authorization can be used to provide flexible security management, accurate tracking of
relevant UE data and seamless connectivity [10,11], whereby the MNO/SP can delegate
some security and access management to a third-party or the UE [10].
5G non-standalone networks are being deployed, while 5G standardization is now on
phase 2 Rel-17 [12], but D2D communications was never standardized for any previous
mobile network generations, and it is still the case. However, the legacy system specified
some ProSe functionalities and also being considered in many 5G applications [7,9,13–15].
D2D security has been investigated in related work (e.g., [16–19]), but these research efforts
did not consider 5G’s new use cases such as multiple shareholders, tactile Internet, edge
and third-party services [2]. This implies that existing protocols cannot be trusted to
address rising security challenges based on the new use cases, such as securing data access,
caching and sharing, as well as authorization and user’s access right delegation for D2D
users in 5G. Therefore, we propose a D2D level security solution, consisting of D2D Service
security (DDSec) and D2D Attributes and Capability security (DDACap) protocols that
provide authentication and authorization in network- and non-network-assisted scenarios,
respectively, enabling two UEs in proximity to access, cache and share data in different
scenarios. In this paper, service, data, data object and content are used interchangeably.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We explore how D2D communications can be used to offload traffic and push contents
to the edge closer to the end user in 5G.
• We propose a D2D security solution for authentication, data caching and sharing
authorization in network-assisted and non-network-assisted D2D communications
scenarios. The solution consists of two security protocols for providing authentication
and authorization to D2D users facilitated by Identity-based Encryption (IBE), Elliptic
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) and access control mechanisms.
• We model and formally analyze the proposed protocols using formal methods and
automated protocol verifier ProVerif with applied pi calculus.
• We also analyze the protocols security properties conscientiously using two tax-
onomies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Related works on D2D security in legacy
and 5G systems are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 discusses D2D service delivery, system
architecture and D2D communications processes. In Section 4, the problem is defined and
the proposed D2D security solution is presented. The modeling of the proposed security
protocols is presented in Section 5. In Section 6, the formal verification of the protocols is
presented. Section 7 analyzes and evaluates the protocols’ security properties. The paper is
finally concluded in Section 8.
2. Related Work
5G will provide enhanced Mobile Broadband, ultra-reliable low latency communica-
tions, massive machine-type communications to support augmented reality, virtual reality,
eHealth systems and smart cities [2,6]. With D2D communications used as an underlay
technology in 5G, its legacy security solutions for Long-Term Evolution (LTE) will be inad-
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equate to address 5G-enabled D2D communications. Zhang et al. [16] proposed a secure
data sharing protocol for a UE to access SP services in Long-Term Evolution Advanced
(LTE-Advanced) network. It provided mutual authentication, non-repudiation, traceability,
data confidentiality and integrity. In [17], the authors investigated security and privacy for
D2D communications using LTE-D2D architecture and applications and proposed security
solutions to address application and physical layers. This work was based on Fourth
Generation (4G) architectures and old D2D communications technologies.
In [19], the authors explored key distribution in D2D communications and proposed a
lightweight key distribution scheme using acceleration sensors, introducing a lightweight
extreme points extraction and filtering algorithm to extract extreme points for key genera-
tion. In [20], the authors proposed a universal authentication and key agreement protocol
for D2D communications, providing privacy-preserving, session key generation and mu-
tual authentication between D2D users using different scenarios. Wang et al. [21] proposed
an anonymous authentication and key agreement secure protocol for D2D communica-
tions, providing mutual authentication, session key, real identity leakage prevention and
secure communications. However, service access authorization and data security were
not covered.
In [22], the authors introduced a new privacy-preserving security architecture for a fog
computing model with the cooperative D2D communication support and proposed three
lightweight anonymous authentication protocols to support three distinct circumstances
in D2D-Aided fog computing to secure IoT applications. Seok et al. [23] explored the
security issues raised as a result of emerging IoT technology with 5G. They then proposed
secure D2D communication based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and lightweight
authenticated encryption with associated data ciphers to address IoT devices’ security. It
mainly covered IoT security issues when emerged with D2D communications, not focusing
on D2D specific scenarios or service authorization.
Wang et al. [24] discussed 5G-enabled Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) security
related issues and then proposed a hybrid D2D message authentication scheme for D2D-
VANETs, providing mutual authentication for vehicle-to-vehicle communication. In [25],
performance and security issues e-health IoT devices are explored and a new mutual
authentication protocol for m-health systems based on D2D communication to protect
data shared between IoT devices is proposed. Wang et al. [26] investigated D2D group
communication security and proposed a dynamic group key agreement protocol to provide
a constant-round authentication in D2D group communications, whereby the D2D users
communicate and authenticate without NodeB or base station.
In [18], the authors explored authentication and key management for D2D/5G communica-
tions and proposed a framework based on the physical layer that provides entity authentication
and key establishment solution to address the related issues. Wang et al. [27] also investigated
physical security for D2D communications. Then, they proposed an access selection scheme for
D2D users to protect cellular users against eavesdropping, using jamming techniques to inter-
rupt the eavesdropper, and an optimization method to prove optimal threshold and developed
an iterative algorithm to determine the optimal threshold. Li et al. [28] explored communication
delay and network capacity issues. They proposed a security and energy-aware collaborative
task offloading for D2D communications. They formulated the collaborative task offloading
problem that minimizes the time-average delay and energy consumption of devices while
ensuring data security.
Yan et al. [29] discussed the importance of securing communication data and thus pro-
posed a security scheme based on trust and evaluated D2D users for D2D communications
data access control in LTE based on Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) mechanism. In [30],
data security, identity privacy and system scalability are explored. The authors proposed
a robust and scalable data access control scheme in D2D communications with scalable
system attributes and each base station controls the attribute universe individually. The
core network server acts as the central authority, and the complicated decryption can be
offloaded from an inadequate device to a more capable one.
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The discussed related works address some of the security issues that are affecting
different D2D communications applications providing mutual authentication, session key
generation, access controls and data security. However, they do not cover D2D communi-
cations from an abstractive point of view, whereby we explore D2D security at the network
and service levels of D2D communications. We address entity authentication and access,
caching, sharing authorization, data security and user’s access right delegation for D2D
users in 5G. Most of the related works address authentication or service access control for
D2D communications, but not both. In addition, data dissemination, multiple shareholders
and supporting technologies in 5G such as Content Delivery Network (CDN) [31], edge
services by third party SP and end users’ demand for high reliability and high availability
have not been considered. Our proposed solution provides robust authentication and
authorization mechanisms that can be integrated with the next generation mobile network.
Moreover, in our proposed solution, two security protocols are designed to address security
in two D2D communications scenarios. We consider the changes in the mobile system
and integration with security mechanisms specified in [1] at network and service levels
of the 5G and D2D communications systems [2] as well as address security of the UE,
transmission and the data.
3. Service Delivery in 5G-Enabled D2D Communications Network
To distribute and deliver content to the end user efficiently, content delivery models
such as CDN must be adopted; cache servers deployed at edge [32] and UEs are used as
cache nodes [33] to support content caching. The introduction of CDN and content caching
in mobile network can be integrated with Content-Centric Networking (CCN) [34] to turn
mobile network into a content aware network [2].
3.1. System Model
5G requires an efficient service system, access and delivery models to support its objectives,
which can be achieved by integrating other architectures and services with 5G. We adopt a
system model that consists of Cloud Radio Access Network (C-RAN) [35], CCN [34] and D2D
communications [7] as suggested in [15]:
• C-RAN is adopted for the centralization of base stations, resources virtualization and
edge service deployment.
• CCN is adopted for content distribution and caching.
• D2D communications is adopted for direct communication, content dissemination
and data offloading.
C-RAN centralizes the baseband resources to a single baseband unit called Baseband
Unit (BBU) pool, connecting to the remote radio heads transceivers combing the function
of the base station. In addition, the interface between BBU and radio heads has been
changed from circuit fronthaul to packet fronthaul. BBU is divided into the distributed
unit responsible for physical layer and real-time MAC layer process and the centralized
unit responsible for upper layer computations process [35]. The UE connects to ngRAN,
Security Anchor Function (SEAF) or Access and Mobility Function (AMF) to access the
network. The 5GC consists of various network functions such as Session Management
Function (SMF), Authentication Server Function (AUSF) and Unified Data Management
(UDM) [36] residing in the Home Network (HN).
The system model in Figure 1 consists of the following entities:
• UE: Transmitter and receiver.
• Next generation NodeB (gNB): Base station connecting UE to the network.
• HN: UE registers to and receives services from it.
The CCN protocol can be embedded into the UE, BBU pool, edge routers and 5GC [15], or
the control and user plane enhancement can be implemented to enable services such as CCN
as 5GC network functions and extend the interfaces to support CCN-protocol data unit ses-
sions [37]. To access services, the UE must be registered with MNO/SP and subscribed to those
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services, whereby the UE can request to access the network, perform primary authentication
with HN and then request to access services depending on the service level agreement [10].
Figure 1. System model.
After a successful primary authentication, a secondary authentication and service
authorization may be required between the UE and SP, to authorize the UE to access third
party services, cache and share data with other UEs [38,39]. MNO/SP is responsible for
services subscription, authorizing service access and content retrieval. MNO controls the
user’s access to the network, connection establishment, resource allocation and security
management. MNO/SP might also want to hide their visibility or deny the UE from
accessing their services. There is an inter-operator agreement between different networks
to provide inter-operator roaming services.
3.2. Service Access and Delivery
With content access and retrieval process, the original named data object is published
by the content provider/data owner using a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of the
data as the data identity (ID) or data name which is advertised on the MNO/SP network.
Thus, for service discovery, the UE searches for specific data by data ID and some contact
information from the owner’s routing table are requested, which are in search tolerance
of the data ID [40]. The UE must learn the ID/key mapping that associates a UE’s ID
with the data to be able to request data objects on the network. Additionally, the UE
which has been granted access to the data can publish the data based on the content owner
and SP security policies. The named data object and UE’s ID are mapped together into
logical/node address. The UE interested in the data uses the logical address to send interest
messages to the UE in possession of the data.
The process of content dissemination and service delivery starts with the UE generat-
ing an interest message which is forwarded to BBU through radio heads. BBU starts a CCN
forwarding process to match the request content name [15,37]. If the targeted content exists
in BBU pool content store, the content is sent back to the UE, fulfilling the initial request.
During content forwarding, the involved entities can choose to cache a content replica or
not, which might also depend on the security parameters such as cache authorization. The
content retrieval process of D2D communications involves cache satisfaction at BBU, UE
and 5GC. Two applications of content retrieval are considered: (1) where the content is
being matched at the 5GC; and (2) where the content is being matched locally by another
UE in proximity, as shown in Figure 1.
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However, if the content request is not matched at the UE locally or from the UE in
coverage or BBU, the interest is forwarded to 5GC. If it is matched in the content store of
5GC, then the content is pushed backwards to the UE. The traffic burden is reduced on
backhaul if the request does not go to the 5GC and the content retrieval is achieved by
using fronthaul and D2D links. BBU pool discovers cached content by associated devices
and content transmission is performed using D2D communications. To achieve this process,
the security requirements for accessing network and service, data caching and sharing
must be achieved. We assume that initial authentication of each UE with its HN has been
performed and the two HNs have already agreed on the roaming service agreement. Before
the establishment of secure D2D communications, each UE sends a verification request to
its gNB or another UE. Then, the authentication and authorization procedure is initiated,
the UEs exchange security vectors and they verify each other using the proposed protocols
for a secure data transmission.
D2D discovery and communication are performed during content dissemination.
Content discovery is based on CCN interest and data object messages, which is associated
with the data name and UE’s ID.
3.3. D2D Communications Process
The D2D communications process consists of device discovery, link step up and data
transmission stages similar to that defined for ProSe in [7] to satisfy a service request and
establish a communication session. The communication of the UE in cellular coverage and
initiation of direct communication between two UEs are controlled by the base station,
whereas the complete direct communication and out of coverage are controlled by the D2D
devices. The requesting UE can send a broadcast message to discover any UE in proximity
or a specific content and the UE with the content can send a broadcast about its data. If a
UE receives a request message, it sends a response message via link setup stage. The data
transmission can be established with or without the help of gNB. The full security process
is presented in Section 5.
3.3.1. D2D Communications Network Assisted
D2D connectivity is initiated by gNB via SMF/AMF. When data packets reach the
SMF, data packets in the form of Internet Protocol (IP) or CCN can be analyzed by the 5GC
whether the link can be considered as a D2D link or not. This process starts from Step 1. It
is assumed that a UE can discover other UEs in proximity, hence a UE can also initiate D2D
connectivity and start the process from Step 3.
The generic and concise D2D connectivity process in Figure 2 is explained in the
following steps:
1. When the SMF receives a session request message, it checks if the transmitter and
receiver are within the same cell and the channel condition can support D2D commu-
nications. Then, it initiates the D2D connectivity with the help of gNB. The request
messages include UE IDs and data name.
2. Then, gNB starts a strategy list of communication patterns, push uplink shared
channel, physical uplink control channel, power indicator, scan spectrum and time.
After analyzing the request messages from SMF, it sends the message to UE1.
3. UE1, hoping to make D2D connectivity with UE2, sends regular information in the
physical radio access channel with binary code, UE ID, data name and the UE can
also detect received information from other UEs.
4. After matching the targeted UE2, the initiating UE1 sends the D2D connectivity
request to gNB.
5. Then, gNB analyzes the D2D connectivity request and chooses the best communica-
tion pattern for the D2D pair based on the conditions of the channel and cell resource
utilization.
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6. Sometimes the D2D connectivity request fails; the normal cellular communication
mode is adapted and the communication between the UEs goes back to the conven-
tional cellular mode.
7. Conversely, if the D2D mode request including orthogonal or reused pattern is per-
mitted, gNB establishes a strategy list including communication patterns, power
indicator, scan spectrum and scan time and sends it to UE1.
8. After completing the channel measurement such as normalized interference intervals,
UE1 provides an update to gNB.
9. gNB allocates spectrum resource to UE1 and lets UE2 recognize the same channel.
Training sequences at the allocated channel are sent by the UE1 to help UE2 to get the
link quality. Then, UE2 sends a confirmation message back to UE1 after checking that
the link quality is suitable and UE1 confirms it to gNB.
Figure 2. D2D connectivity process flowchart.
3.3.2. D2D Communications Non-Network Assisted
This is similar to Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET); however, the D2D link uses a
reserved cellular licensed spectrum for an out-band communication, also referred to as
public safety network. This is a direct communication between UEs with a controlled link
establishment by the UEs.
1. UE1, hoping to make direct communication, transmits beacon signals with low frame
rate to reduce signaling overhead.
2. UE2, in proximity, responds by sending acknowledgement messages.
3. The received messages are evaluated based on metrics, such as Signal-to-Interference-
plus-Noise Ratio (SINR).
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4. The UEs can start direct communication with each other, when a received signal is
above the predetermined metrics threshold with a good quality of service.
The beacon signals are transmitted over channels that are dedicated for transmitting
control signals, whereas data exchange is performed using shared data channels. To
establish safe and secured links in D2D communications, the beacon signals broadcast
contains security vectors within the packet frames. 5G UEs are capable of an authentication
process with low signaling overhead.
4. Security in 5G-Enabled D2D Communications Network
This section presents the problem definition and the proposed security solution for
D2D communications in a 5G system.
4.1. Problem Definition
5G promises to create new use cases, support vertical services, reduce backhaul traffic
and push content closer to the users facilitated by D2D communications. However, security
in D2D communications has been a serious concern due its wireless characteristics [41],
omission of third-party and 5G’s heterogeneous nature, which present several security
vulnerabilities that put the whole network at risk from new and old threats [2]. D2D-based
content distribution [9,42] and traffic offloading will increase the vulnerabilities of entities
and data. In addition, security for services and user’s data at the edge is another concern.
Security issues in D2D communications and CCN systems [43–46] have been investi-
gated separately, but not for an integrated system. The system can be affected by attacks
such as eavesdropping, data fabrication, spoofing, content poisoning, privacy violation, de-
nial of services, masquerading and linkability attacks [47–49]. Due to the self-management
of D2D UEs, implementing security and privacy is difficult and more challenging in 5G
as privacy violation increases when D2D users are accessing ProSe. The HN and visited
network could also be curious and eavesdrop on D2D communications. These attacks
require robust authentication methods for a secure communication between D2D users [16]
and access control methods to secure service access and delivery [29,30].
After primary authentication methods such as 5G-Authentication and Key Agreement
(AKA) [1] is used to authenticate the UE to the HN [50], the UE is usually granted static
authorization, but, with edge computing, third-party services, increasing demand for
multimedia contents and tactile Internet in 5G, access authorization is more complicated.
Therefore, multi-level security measures must be used to allow interoperability between
different security domains. MNO/SP should be able to restrict access to its services even
when the UE is not in coverage. Thus, network access and service protocols must be used to
allow the UE gain access to services provided by MNO/SP in HN or data network [39,50]
and enable secure service sharing between UEs.
4.2. Proposed D2D Security Solution
After gaining access to network and services, the UE can request other UEs in prox-
imity to share services following D2D communications process as specified in [13]. We
propose a D2D level security solution to address the mentioned security issues to enable
UEs access, cache and share content securely in different D2D communications scenarios
of 5G such as roaming, non-roaming, in coverage and out of coverage shown in Figure 3
and explained as follows:
1. Scenario A: Intra-operator, non-roaming and same cell, both UEs are in cellular
coverage of gNB, same HN and subscribed to the same MNO .
2. Scenario B: Intra-operator, non-roaming and different cells, both in HN coverage,
subscribed and served by the same operator but in different cells.
3. Scenario C: Inter-operators and roaming, one UE is in HN, while the other UE is
roaming in visited network, and both users subscribe to different operators.
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4. Scenario D: Inter-operators and out of coverage, both UEs are out of coverage and can
share content without involving their HNs. It also applies to emergency situations.
Both UEs subscribed to different operators.
Figure 3. D2D communications scenarios. (A) same cell/same operator, (B) different cells/same
operator, (C) roaming mode/different operators and (D) out of coverage/different operators.
The D2D security solution consists of DDSec and DDACap protocols, which intend to
provide authentication and authorization to access, cache and share data between two UEs
in different D2D scenarios. Additionally, a UE will be able to transfer its access permissions
and abilities to another UE. DDSec is intended for network-assisted D2D communications,
while DDACap is intended for non-network-assisted direct D2D communications.
The UEi is free to choose any publicly known information as its ID such as public key or
IP address based on IBE scheme [51]; this can be used together with another form of ID such
as the Generic Public Subscription Identifier (GPSI) from primary authentication [1,50] and
external ID (EID) and federated ID (FID) from secondary authentication and authorization pro-
cedures [38,39], respectively. This eliminates the need for distributing keys as in the traditional
AKA or Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and use of Subscriber’s Permanent Identifier (SUPI)
outside the HN as specified in 5G standard [1]. For integrity, privacy and uniqueness, the UE
uses a pseudonym ID in D2D communications calculated from the UE’s preferred choice of
ID, hash(x(ID)), where x is the public key of UE, randomly generated using hash function
hash(PKUEi (ID)) [40]. The relation between UE and data is determined by pseudonym IDs
of the UE and the data which become the logical address nAdd of the UE with the data. The
data’s unique ID D1 is generated by hashing the data name hash(URI). The UEi would first
hash both the UE’s pseudonym ID and D1 as hash(UEID, D1) and then publish it as its logical
address. The keys and IDs are generated using ECIES [52] according to 5G standard [1].
4.3. Security Requirement
The UE is capable of cryptographic computation using its Universal Subscriber’s
Identity Module (USIM); each UE generates its own self-certifying public key PKUEi and
private key SKUEi [53]. The PK(UEi) is used as part of its pseudonym ID. The UEi generates
the secret key SKUEi by selecting a random number using chosen binary ECC, and then
its public key PKUEi is computed from SKUEi [52]. Each UEi sends its public key and
pseudonym ID to gNB in terms of network-assisted application and to each other in direct
communication application. Traditionally, certificates would be used to bind the UEi to
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its public key, however in this case self-certifying public keys are used. The UEi stores
its public/private keys PKUEi, SKUEi and public key hash hash(PKUEi ) while gNB stores
the public keys, pseudonym ID and other relevant information of all users in the cell.
A timestamp is used to prevent replay attacks and check the validity of the token. It is
evaluated by checking if it is within a given time-window relying on the clock of the UE. The
message timestamp must be equal or slightly off by seconds to the current time/date, while
the token lifetime time/date must be after the current time/date. Furthermore, the UEs can
generate hash functions, symmetric and asymmetric keys and digital signatures achieved
using ECIES and IBE. ECIES is suitable for systems with low computational capabilities and
resources, such as mobile devices and smart cards due to the point multiplication operation.
The proposed protocols use ECIES as applied by 5G to conceal SUPI and generation of the
anchor key [1].
The expected security properties to be achieved by the DDSec and DDACap protocols
are informally defined before the formalization of the protocol properties. The taxonomies
in [54,55] are adopted for precise formal analysis referred to as Set 1 and Set 2, respectively.
In Set 1, the security properties are specified from an Agent A’s point of view, with four
levels defined between two Agents A and B: aliveness, weak agreement, non-injective
agreement and injective agreement. In Set 2, the security protocol should meet the follow-
ing security properties: mutual entity authentication, mutual key authentication, mutual
key confirmation, key freshness, unknown-key share and key compromise impersonation
resilience.
4.4. Authentication and Authorization
The UEi authenticates to the HN with SUPI as part of the primary authentication.
After a successful authentication, it generates its self-certifying key pairs and pseudonym
ID and sends a service request with pseudonym ID to gNB for D2D services, where gNB
maintains a registration table to associate the UEIDs with PKUEi and service information.
For example, UEA with data can advertise or publish its ID UA and DataName or UEB
interested in the data can send an interest its ID UEB and DataName using UEA’s log-
ical address nAdd. Then, mutual authentication is initiated and achieved using PKUEi ,
hash(PKUEi ) and nonce. After authentication, UEA sends data to UEB via conventional
routing mechanisms of D2D communications and CCN processes. For routing, the UE
can reach another UE in proximity using the UE’s nAdd and each UE in the routing path
without exposing any other interface. If the UEs did not communicate before, then they
have no cached security context. If they have communicated before, then the valid cached
data, such as IDs and public keys, can still be used for authentication and authorization.
The UEs can get authorized to access, cache and share the data without involving BBU
pool or gNB as central authority, even though the security context such as data encryption
keys might be set by third party. Therefore, authorization procedure might depend on
the MNO set policies and service agreements between the UE and HN or SPs such as
access controls, FID and security tokens. It leverages on security tokens, user access rights
delegation, capabilities and attributes of the user and the data [39,56]. The UE can also use
GPSI or FID as its global profile to the UEs previously authorized via a federated-based
authorization instead of the pseudonym ID [39].
The data owner creates capabilities in the form of labels for the UE and data object
during service authorization by SP, and each object is given a specific set of access rights that
can be granted to a UE [39]. The capabilities are represented as a dot-separated sequence of
numbers, a string .i1.i2...in for some value n where i1, i2, ..., in are integers [56]. The user’s
capabilities ucap are transferable through delegation process [39]. The data object consists
of the data object name, metadata, payload and other non-encrypted configuration. The
metadata consists of publication date, expiry date, creation time and access control profile.
The access attribute and capability are specified in access control profile which includes
data’s capabilities dcap, a symmetric nonce key Kd1 and its key ID (hKd1) for decrypting
the data. The Kd1 is the hash(nonce, DataName) while the key ID is the hash of the key
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hash(Kd1) signed by the data owner’s private key SKDO. For D2D communications, the
UE with data and delegated attributes creates an ACap token consisting of authorization
attributes and capabilities, ACap = {D1, DA, hKd1, exp}:
• D1: DataName.
• DA: Dataset delegation (true), label (ucap2.3), data owner ID (hDOID), data owner’s
public key PKDO, token ACap owner ID (UB), scope (offline access, cache, share,
any).
• hKd1: Nonce key ID signed by data owner’s private key SKDO
• Exp: Token expiry date.
The delegated access rights include dataset delegation; if set to true, then it permits
the delegation of attributes and capabilities to other users in line with the data owner’s
set permissions. It also includes the scope of user/client’s access rights in relations with
the data object, data owner’s ID (hDOID), data owner’s public key and user’s ID of the
UE in possession of data. The nonce key is a symmetric key for decrypting the data object.
The ucap’s 2.3 should match the dcap 2.3, i.e., 2 = caching and 3 = sharing. For the D2D
users, the access duration depends on the expiry date of the data not the ACap expiry date.
The ucap is not user specific; anyone could access the data so long as they are in possession
of the right ucap and encryption key as set by the data owner. In a scenario where the UE
wants to share its owned data, it can generate an encryption key and ACap token, hence
becoming a data owner and a token generator.
5. Modeling of the Proposed Protocols
This section presents the modeling of the proposed DDSec and DDACap security
protocols. The UEs should be able to access and share restricted services even in the case
where certain roaming agreements do not apply. At this security level, the UE can use some
of the primary, secondary and federated security context such as preshared session keys
and federated IDs, however it is still capable of generating its own cryptographic primitives
and security vectors, as explained in Section 4. It leverages on security parameters and
guarantees used in network access security [50] and service level security [39] mechanisms.
These protocols apply cryptographic primitives such as those specified in 5G standard [1] to
achieve the security requirements of 5G-enabled D2D communications. The cryptographic
primitives used include symmetric and asymmetric encryption, one-way hash function,
digital signature and message authentication code.
5.1. DDSec Protocol
The proposed DDSec protocol is modeled using UEA, UEB and gNB entities based
on the system model presented in Section 3 and a network-assisted D2D scenario. For
simplification, it is assumed that UEA has already been granted access to the service (data)
and has been authorized to cache and share data. Therefore, UEA can share data and
delegate its access right and capabilities to UEB. UEA and UEB can use the proposed
DDSec protocol to mutually authenticate and share data assisted by gNB.
DDSec Protocol Message Exchange and Execution
Before running the protocol, UEA and UEB would have achieved a successful network
access authentication through primary authentication procedure using 5G-AKA/5G EAP-
AKA’ protocols [50] with the HN. The communication between the UEs and gNB is secured
with respective keys KgNBa and KgNBb, derived after a successful primary authentication.
UEA is also in possession of a symmetric key Kd1 for decrypting the data, received as part
of the service authorization procedure that grants the UE access to the service as presented
in [39]. UEA can advertise to other devices in proximity including gNB about the data in its
possession; in addition, gNB would have information on IDs, previous data transmissions,
data names and data owners. Additionally, when another UE sends an interest message
about that data, gNB assists in the D2D device discovery and link setup between the two
UEs. The protocol messages exchange is among UEA, UEB and gNB entities for Scenarios
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A–C in Figure 3 Section 4.2. In the case of Scenarios B and C, two gNBs would be used.
Figure 4 illustrates messages execution for Scenario A, with reference to notation in Table 1
and described as follows.
Figure 4. DDSec protocol message exchange flow.
Table 1. DDSec and DDACap protocols notation and description.
Notation Description
UEA/UEB/UEC UE










KgNB session key (UE and gNB)
hKd1 nonce key ID
UA/UB/UC pseudonym ID hash(X)UEID))
DOID data owner’s ID
hDOID hash(DOID)
h(x) hash value of message x
{x}{k} message encrypted with key K
Msg1 UEA → gNB:({AdvMsg},{KgNBa})
UEA sends an advertisement to gNB that it is in possession of data. The advertisement
message AdvMsg includes the data name DataName, its pseudonym ID (UA), logical
address nAdd and public key PKUEA encrypted with preshared key KgNBa with gNB. Then,
gNB updates its registration table and BBU Pool updates the intra cell content database
with the received message.
Msg2 UEB → gNB:({IntMsg},{KgNBb})
UEB sends an interest message IntMsg to the affiliated BBU pool via gNB, which includes
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its pseudonym ID (UB), data name DataName of the data it is interested in and its public
key PKUEB encrypted with preshared KgNBb with gNB.
Msg3.gNB→UEA:({DiscMsg},{KgNBa})
gNB with BBU pool check intra cell content database for an interest match within the local
cell coverage or the D2D users in proximity via AMF which may have information about
other UEs from other cells in intra or inter operator scenarios. If there is a match, gNB
initiates the D2D communications process of discovery and link setup between UEA and
UEB via D2D communications supported by SMF. In this case, BBU pool finds a match
from UEA, gNB sets up a link with UEB and forwards (UB), DataName and PKUEB to UEA
in DiscMsg message encrypted with key KgNBa.
Msg4.gNB→UEB:({LinkUpMsg},{KgNBb})
gNB forwards UEA’s (UA), data name DataName, logical address nAdd and public key
PKUEA to UEB in LinkUPMsg message encrypted with key KgNBb.
Msg5.UEA→UEB:({PublMsg},{PKUEB})
After the confirmation of link quality of the allocated channel, UEA initiates the authentica-
tion request by sending a PublMsg message that includes its pseudonym ID (UA), data
name DataName, data ID (D1), a nonce Rand_a as authentication challenge, a timestamp
Ts1 and hash of the message hash(UA, DataName, D1, Rand_a, Ts1) signed with its private
key SKUEA . and PublMsg is encrypted with UEB’s public key PKUEB . The hashing is used
for integrity and message authentication and timestamp for replay attack protection.
Msg6.UEB→UEA:({LookUp},{PKUEA})
When UEB receives Message 5, it responds with a LookUp message that includes its
pseudonym ID (UB) and data name pseudonym ID D1, confirming the data name and
its ID. UEB also returns the nonce Rand_a, together with new nonce Rand_b, a timestamp
Ts2, hash of the whole message (UB, D1, Rand_a, Rand_b, Ts2) signed with its private key
SKUEB and encrypt the LookUp message with UEA’s public key PKUEA . UEB authenticates
UEA by sending back Rand_a together with Rand_b.
Msg7.UEA→UEB:({SendData},{PKUEB})
When UEA receives Message 6, it generates attribute and capabilities token Acap using the
permission delegation authorization granted by original data owner. Then, UEA returns
Rand_b to confirm a successful authentication of UEB together with the requested DATA,
Kd1 symmetric key to decrypt the data, ACap token authorizing UEB to cache, share data
and delegate its access rights to another UE and hash of the symmetric key and the token
hash(Kd1, ACap) signed with SKUEA in SendData message encrypted with PKUEB .
5.2. DDACap Protocol
The proposed DDACap protocol is modeled using UEB and UEC entities based on the
system model presented in Section 3 and a non-network-assisted D2D scenario with the
same assumptions and security requirements as DDSec protocol in Section 5.1. The UEs
would be allowed to access and share data even in the scenarios where certain roaming
agreements do not apply, out of coverage and during a disaster situation. The UEs use some
security context from DDSec if it applies to the scenario, however they are still capable of
generating their own cryptographic primitives and security parameters such as timestamps
and tokens. After UEA shares the data and delegates its capabilities to UEB, UEB can use
the similar security attributes and capabilities for user and data object to cache and share
the data with UEC without the assistance of the network. For UEB to share the data with
UEC, both entities do not have to be on the same security level. UEB and UEC can use
the proposed DDACap protocol for authentication and authorization of data caching and
sharing.
DDACap Protocol Message Exchange and Execution
The overview of the DDACap protocol execution involves UEB and UEC. The protocol
initiation can be performed by the interested UE or the UE with data. In this case, UEB
with data initiates the direct communication by sending beacon signals with advertisement
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message and UEC in proximity responds with interest messages. When the messages are
evaluated and the signal has exceeded the predetermined metric threshold, both UEs start
to communicate directly. The control signal and the data are exchanged over share data
channels. The protocol messages exchange is between UEB and UEC for Scenario D in
Figure 3 (Section 4.2), as illustrated in Figure 5, similarly with reference to notations in
Table 1 and described as follows.
Figure 5. DDACap protocol message exchange flow.
Msg1 UEB → UEC:({AdvMsg})
UEB sends beacons signals with an advertisement message AdvMsg by broadcasting to
the D2D users in proximity which includes UEC. It includes its pseudonym ID (UB), data
name DataName, logical address nAdd, its public key PKUEB and hash of its public key
hash(PKUEB) signed with its private key SKUEB , the hash is used for integrity and message
authentication.
Msg2 UEC →UEB:({IntMsg},{PKUEB})
UEC sends an interest message IntMsg to UEB by replying AdvMsg. It includes its
pseudonym ID (UC), data name DataName of its interest, public key PKUEC and its hash
(hash(PKUEC ) signed with its private key SKUEC and encrypted with UEB’s public key
PKUEB hoping to make a direct communication.
Msg3.UEB→UEC:({PublMsg},{PKUEC})
When UEB receives Message 2, it responds with publish message PublMsg. UEB generates
a nonce Rand_rb as authentication challenges, a timestamp Ts3 for freshness and replay
protection, pseudonym ID of DataName (D1) and hash of the whole message hPublMsg
=hash(UB, D1, Rand_rb, Ts1) signed with its private key SKUEB . UEB sends the PublMsg
message that includes (UB), D1, Rand_rb, Ts3 and hPublMsg as an authentication request
encrypted with UEC’s public key PKUEC .
Msg4.UEC→UEB:({LookUp},{PKUEB})
Both UEs evaluate the received messages to establish direct communication over dedicated
channels. Then, UEC responds with LookUp message that includes its ID (UC), the data
name D1, new nonce rand_rc, nonce Rand_rb, a timestamp Ts4 and hash of the whole mes-
sage hash(UC, D1, Rand_rb, Rand_rc, Ts4) signed by its private key SKUEC . The LookUp
message is encrypted with PKUEB . UEC authenticates UEB by sending back Rand_rb
together Rand_rc.
Msg5.UEB→UEC:({SendData},{PKUEC})
When UEB receives Message 4, it checks if there are any delegated permissions; if there
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are, then it generates attributes and capabilities token Acap1. It returns Rand_rc to confirm
a successful authentication of UEC, together with requested DATA, ACap1 token with
abilities and capabilities string, Kd1 symmetric key to decrypt the data and hash of the
symmetric key and token hash(ACap, Kd1 signed with SKUEB to UEC in SendData message
encrypted with PKUEC .
6. Verification of the Proposed Protocols
This section formally models and verifies the proposed protocols using formal meth-
ods and ProVerif. The security properties are formalized with ProVerif results.
6.1. Formal Methods
Formal methods and automated tools have been used to verify mobile network secu-
rity to assess their security properties [20,50], hence providing strong security guarantees.
Security protocols properties are very challenging for most verification techniques and
tools. This is due to the use of cryptographic primitive and algebraic properties that are
hard for symbolic reasoning, hence certain tools and manual proof checks are not suit-
able [50]. However, there are automated verification tools that can be used for protocol
modeling and analysis such as Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications (AVISPA) [57] and ProVerif [58].
ProVerif [58] is an automatic tool for analyzing security protocols, with Dolev–Yao [59]
as the adversarial model and enabling the verification of security properties, by supporting
equational theories defined by users. It supports the underlying theory of abstraction,
focusing on unbounded sessions, and uses precise Horn clause abstraction and applied pi
calculus [60] as a formal language for modeling security protocols. The syntax is paired
with a formal semantics to enable reasoning about protocols. It also supports a variety
of cryptographic primitives, modeled by equations and rewrite rules. Additionally, it
takes the security properties to be proved, such as authentication, secrecy or observational
equivalence, as input. It translates the protocol into an internal representation by Horn
clauses, which makes crucial abstractions in order to support an unbounded number of
sessions. Cryptographic primitives are modeled as functions, messages as terms built
over an infinite set of names such as a, b, c, ..., variables such as x, y, z, ... and a finite set
of function symbols such as f 1, ..., f n. The syntax of ProVerif process language is shown
in Table 2 and a full description can be found in [58]. Therefore, ProVerif suits the type
of analysis conducted in this paper. It has been used before to formally verify security
protocols [38,39,50].
Table 2. Core language: term and process grammar.
Term Grammar
M, N ::= term
a, b, c, k, s name
x, y, z variable
h(M1, . . . ,Mn) constructor/destructor application
D ::= expressions
fail failure
P, Q ::= processes
out(N,M); P output
in(N, x : T); P input
!P !P replication
0 nil
P | Q parallel composition
new a : T; P restriction
let x : T = D in P else Q expression evaluation
if M then P else Q conditional
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6.2. Formal Verification Using Proverif
The modeling of a protocol in ProVerif is composed of declaration, process macros and
main processes with queries to verify the security properties of a protocol. The ProVerif
code is used to specify the protocol concisely using declaration of types, functions, queries
and events. Free names are globally known, whereas bound names are locally known by
the process such as the public channel for communication, while [private] excludes names
from the attacker [58].
Specification includes the following:
• functions: fun encrypt(bitstring, pkey): bitstring., key: type key., private
and public names: free rand_a: bitstring[private] free pubChannel : channel.
• Queries: On secrecy, reachability and authentication. A secrecy property is specified
as a query of the attacker’s knowledge attacker(M). When the fact attacker(M) is
derivable, the attacker may have the knowledge of M, but, if it is not derived, there
is no way that the attacker can gain the knowledge of M. With reachability, the query
attacker(K) is also used to debug the model of the protocol to check a particu-
lar branch is reachable or not, query k: bitstring; event(endServer(k)). The
authentication properties are specified as correspondence assertions in the form of
event(e1(M)) event(e2(M)) which have to be proven. In the case of the DDSec and
DDACap protocols, the following is queried to test the secrecy of message attributes
such as query attacker (rand_a) for a nonce, query attacker (ua) for id and
query attacker (skuea) for key. query C:host,B:host,K:pkey, rand_rc:nonce;
event(endUEB(B,C,K,rand_rc)) ==> event(beginUEA(B, C, K,
rand_rc)) is used to test the events’ relationship.
• Events: Querying events to test their relationship. (i) Event correspondence tested
query is a basic correspondence assertion, query x1:t1 . . , xn:tn; event(e(M1,
..,Mj)) ==> event (e’(N1,..,Nk)), for the non-injective correspondence there is at
least one earlier occurrence of e’. (ii) Injective correspondence assertions capture the
one-to-one relationship, query x1:t1, . ., xn:tn; inj-event(e(M1, . . , Mj))
==> inj-event(e’(N1,..,Nk)). The correspondence asserts that, for each occurrence
of event e(M1, . . ,Mj), there is a distinct earlier occurrence of
event e’(N1, . . ,Nk).
• Process: The protocol is encoded using main process and process macros for the
participating entities to allow sub-process being defined as (!process). The main
process also starts off several copies of the system entities (UEs and gNB) with the
relevant parameters representing several sessions of the roles as explained in the
message exchange in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
6.3. Formal Analysis of DDSec Protocol
The protocol is simulated using insecure public channel and processes representing
the entities (!processUEA()) for UEA, (!processUEB()) for UEB and (!processgNB())
for gNB. The security properties we are interested are secrecy, mutual authentication,
authorization and secrecy on communication between the entities. In consideration with
adversary, we formally analyze the protocol, and there were attacks on the protocol, as
shown in Figure 6; hence, the protocol is not secure. ProVerif results show that the secrecy
query holds rand_b, UA, UB, d1, Acap and skuea, skueb does hold, but secrecy of rand_a
does not. In addition, the authentication of UEA to UEB does hold that is non-injective
and injective agreements, but UEB to UEA does not hold. Thus, UEB may end the protocol
thinking it is talking to UEA, while UEA never runs the protocol with UEB.
Event beginUEA means that UEA has completed the protocol and UEA received Mes-
sage 6 and sent Message 7 Event beginUEB means that UEB sent Message 6. All the parame-
ters of the protocol are taken as arguments by these events:
A, B, pkueb, rand_a, rand_b must verify the ID and respond to a nonce with a nonce.
If the arguments match, then data are sent, otherwise it sends authentication failure
and terminates the communication. We would like to prove the correspondence for
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UEA and UEB authentication; event(endUEB(A, B, K, rand_a, rand_b)) ==> event
(beginUEA(A, B, K, rand_a,rand_b)) and inj-event (endUEB(A, B, K, rand_a,
rand_b)) ==> inj-event(beginUEA(A, B, K, rand_a, rand_b)).
The direct proof of this correspondence in ProVerif does not hold. We also try
to prove and conclude the desired correspondence by noticing that event which has
ub, d1, rand_a, rand_b, Ts_1 as argument cannot be executed before ua, d1, rand_a
has been sent. That is, before rand_a request is has been executed with rand_a, rand_b
response and which does not hold.
Figure 6. DDSec protocol attack results.
6.3.1. The Attack on DDSec Protocol
The attack on a protocol can be explained using the attack derivation (abstracts) or
attack trace (semantics). In ProVerif, the derivation explains the actions made by an attacker
to break the security properties of a protocol, using abbreviations of internal representation
of names or terms. It is a numbered list of steps each corresponding to a process or the at-
tacker’s action. While the attack trace represents the real attack as an executable trace of the
considered process. A trace is a sequence of input and outputs on the public channel and of
events in relation with the process. The input, output or event are followed by their location
in the process at {n}, referring to the program point at the beginning of the process. As men-
tioned above, when ProVerif is given query attacker (M) where M is the message transmit-
ted on the channel c, it intends to prove that a state in which a property is unreachable by
showing not attacker (M), the RESULT not attacker (M) is true, whereby the attacker
does not have some term (M) i.e., message M. query x1 : t1, . . , xn : tn ; event
(e(M1, . . , Mj)) ==> event (e’(N1, . . ,Nk)) tests the relationship between events.
The correspondence asserts that, for each occurrence of the event, there is a distinct earlier
occurrence of another event and if it does not then it is false.
Three attacks were found: the attacker I starts by eavesdropping on the commu-
nication between entities, impersonates UEA continuing the protocol with UEB, which
completes the protocol with the attacker instead of UEA as below.
UEA -> gNB: {AdvMsg}, {KgNBa}
UEB -> gNB: {IntMsg}, {KgNBb}
gNB -> UEA: {DiscMsg}, {KgNBa}
gNB -> UEA: {LinkUpMsg}, {KgNBb}
UEA -> I_UEB: {PublMsg}, {PKI}
I_UEA -> UEB: {PublMsg, {PKUEB}
UEB -> I_UEA: {LookUp}, {PKI}
I_UEB -> UEA: {LookUp}, {PKUEA}
UEA -> I_UEB: {SenData}, {PKI}
I_UEA -> UEB: {SenData}, {PKUEB}
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6.3.2. Attack Derivation and Trace
TRACE 1
-- Query not attacker(rand_a[])
Completing...
Starting query not attacker(rand_a[])
goal reachable: attacker(rand_a[])
1 new skuea_36: skey creating skuea_2040 at {1}
2 new skua: sskey creating skua_2041 at {2}
3 new skueb_37: skey creating skueb_2042 at {3}
4 new skub: sskey creating skub_2043 at {4}
5 new kgnba: key creating kgnba_2044 at {5}
6 new kgnbb: key creating kgnbb_2045 at {6}
7 out(c, M) with M = pk(skuea_2040) at {8}
8 out(c, M_2190) with M_2190 = spk(skua_2041) at {10}
9 out(c, M_2262) with M_2262 = pk(skueb_2042) at {12}
10 out(c, M_2333) with M_2333 = spk(skub_2043) at {14}
11 insert keys(A,pk(skuea_2040)) at {15}
12 insert keys(B,pk(skueb_2042)) at {16}
13 The attacker has the message rand_a.
14 A trace has been found.
15 RESULT not attacker(rand_a[]) is false.
TRACE 2
16 new ua_66: id creating ua_7831 at {57} in copy a_7503
17 new ub_67: id creating ub_7832 at {58} in copy a_7503
18 new dataname_68: bitstring creating dataname_7833 at {59} in copy
a_7503
19 out(c, M_7890) with M_7890 = sencrypt((ub_7832,dataname_7833,
pk(skueb_7504)),kgnbb_7509) at {62} in copy a_7503
20 in(c, (PublMsg,a,a_7502)) at {63} in copy a_7503
21 event endUEB(A,B,pk(skueb_7504),rand_a,rand_b) at {64} in copy a_7503
(goal)
22 The event endUEB(A,B,pk(skueb_7504),rand_a,rand_b) is executed.
23 A trace has been found.
24 RESULT event(endUEB(A_107,B_108,K,rand_a_109,rand_b_110)) ==>
event(beginUEA(A_107,B_108,K,rand_a_109,rand_b_110)) is false.
The attacker’s actions are explained in derivations and trace steps concisely, as shown
in Figure 7; some text is omitted for simplicity. The three attack traces follow similar steps
but have varying inputs, outputs and events as follows.
• The first trace, by eavesdropping the attacker knows rand_a, line 1–6 at inputs {1}–{6}
corresponds to the creation of keys. Lines 7–10 at outputs {8}, {10}, {12}, {14} correspond
to the public keys; they are stored in fresh variables M, M_2190, M_2262, M_2333,
respectively, by the attacker for later reuse. Lines 11–12 at inputs {15}, {16} show the
public keys are inserted in the key table in the main process for UEA and UEB. Then,
the attacker gets rand_a[].
• The second and third traces, Lines 1–12 at {1}–{16}, are the same as in Trace 1 while
in Traces 2 and 3 the steps are the same but in different sessions a_7503 and a_9678,
respectively. With Lines 16–17 at inputs {57} and {58} corresponding to creations of
ua, ub, the attacker creates ua_7831, ub_7832 and stores them in a_7503. Thus, Line
19 at output {62} corresponds to a session copy a_7503 UEB has with the attacker,
sending its ID ub_7832 and data name data name_7833, which the attacker stores
in a new variable M_7890 for later use. In the same session, the attacker receives
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(PublMsg,a,a_7502) at input {63}. Line 21 shows the attacker receiving his goal
at {64} when event endUEB(A,B,pk(skueb_7504),rand_a,rand_b) is executed in
a_7503 with UEB as UEB ends the protocol believing it was communicating with
UEA, but in fact it was communicating with the attacker. Trace 2 shows an attack
on non-injective agreement, while Trace 3 shows an attack on injective agreement
executed in session a_9678.
Figure 7. DDSec protocol attack trace.
6.4. Improved Version of DDSec Protocol
To address the attacks discovered in the previous version of DDSec protocol, changes
were made in the protocol modeling. To improve the protocol, UEA sends a nonce rand_na
with the hash of its public key hash(PKUEA) to gNB in Message 1 and UEB sends rand_nb
with the hash of its public key hash(PKUEB) to gNB in Message 2. gNB returns rand_na in
Message 3 and rand_nb to UEB in Message 4. That prevents the attacker from starting a ses-
sion with UEB as it will have to get nonce rand_nb, ID UB and the right hash for the public
key to be trusted by UEB. The nonces together with the hashes of the public key provide the
replay attack and integrity protection for Messages 1–4. The hashing of the keys adds an-
other cryptographic operation to the protocol running as public keys are only known to the
owner and gNB reducing the risk of being altered or leaked. The nonces sent in Messages 3
and 4 by gNB give assurance to UEA that UEB is trusted and vice versa. After the changes
were made, the improved version of the protocol was run again and formally verified, as
shown in Figure 8. ProVerif found no attack this time, hence the protocol is secure. ProVerif
results indicate that the secrecy of rand_a, rand_b, d1, Acap, UA, UB, skuea, skueb
holds and mutual authentication between UEA and UEB also holds as desired on injective
and non-injective agreements.
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Figure 8. DDSec protocol safe results.
6.5. Formal Analysis of DDACap Protocol
The DDACap protocol was also simulated in ProVerif using insecure public channel
and processes (!ProcessUEB()) for UEB and (!ProcessUEC()) for UEC. There was no
attack found, as the ProVerif results show in Figure 9. The desired security properties are
similar to those of the DDSec protocol; however, the IDs (UB/UC) are not queried for
secrecy as they are sent in clear text in DDACap protocol. ProVerif results indicate that
the secrecy of rand_bc, rand_rc, skueb, skuec, d1, Acap holds and mutual authenti-
cation of UEB to UEC holds in the form of non-injective and injective agreements, hence
the protocol has no flaw.
The events that prove the correspondence and arguments taken, ID, PK(X) and
nonce are the same as DDSec protocol. If the arguments match, UEB sends the data to
UEC, otherwise it sends authentication failure and terminates the communication. The
correspondence proved in with the same methods used in Section 6.3. The direct proof of
this correspondence in ProVerif holds because Message 3 is sent before Message 4. The
correspondence is proved and concluded the desired correspondence by noticing that the
event which has uc, d1, rand_rb,rand_rc, Ts_4 as argument cannot be executed before
ub, d1, rand_rb has been sent, that is, before rand_rb request has been executed with
rand_rb,rand_rc response as part of the mutual authentication exchange. Which holds in
ProVerif.
Figure 9. DDACap protocol safe results.
7. Security Analysis
This section presents the security analysis of the protocols’ security properties and
discusses the security consideration of the protocols. Since both DDSec and DDACap
protocols have similar requirement and properties, this analysis focuses on the DDSec
protocol.
7.1. Protocol Security Analysis
Our threat model assumes a Dolev–Yao adversary model [59]; it controls the net-
work and can read, intercept, modify and send messages. It is also capable of carrying
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out eavesdropping, manipulation, interception, impersonation and injection of messages
attacks. The adversary can also apply hashing, encryption and sign on values that are
known to the attacker. The analysis is based on the symbolic protocol model, assuming
that the cryptography is perfect, and the computational strengths of the primitives are not
considered. However, the protocol should meet certain security properties and the analysis
of the protocols is based on security requirements in taxonomies set 1 [54] and set 2 [55],
discussed as follows.
7.1.1. The Analysis Using Security Properties of Set 1
• Secrecy: This is achieved since rand_a and rand_b are never revealed to the attacker.
It also covers confidentiality and privacy of the protocol’s data.
• Aliveness: UEA and UEB obtain the aliveness of each other during PublMsg and
LookUp messages exchange. UEA gets non-injective agreement on rand_a with UEB
and UEB with UEA on rand_b.
• Weak Agreement: This is achieved when both entities obtain non-injective agree-
ment on rand_a, rand_b, respectively, as UEB ends running the protocol with UEA
guaranteed that UEB has been talking to UEB.
• Non-injective Agreement: UEA obtains non-injective agreement on PKUEA and PKUEB
with UEB, respectively, and holds in ProVerif with event(endUEB(A_107, B_108, K,
rand_a_109, rand_b_110)) ==> event(beginUEA(A_107, B_108, K,
rand_a_109, rand_b_110)).
• Injective Agreement: It is central to the protocol’s purpose; injective agreement be-
tween UEA and UEB on PKUEA and PKUEB assures each other that they are known.
UEA to UEB and UEB to UEA holds with inj-event (endUEB(A_116, B_117, K_118,
rand_a_119, rand_b_120)) ==> inj-event (beginUEA(A_116, B_117, K_118,
rand_a_119, rand_b_120)).
7.1.2. The Analysis Using Security Properties of Set 2
• Mutual Entity Authentication: UEA and UEB authenticated each other with A, B,
pkuea, rand_a, rand_b when they proved to hold, hence enforcing
this requirement.
• Mutual Key Authentication: The public keys PKUEA and PKUEB are self-certified, used
as identifiers and hashed. This implicitly authenticates the public keys.
• Mutual Key Confirmation: This requirement does not apply to this protocol as the
UEs generate their own public and private keys. However, since they both use ECIES
that partly enforces this agreement, the successful authentication of UEA to UEB and
UEB to UEA implicitly enforces this requirement.
• Key Freshness: ProVerif has no function to check key freshness, however the messages
exchange includes nonces and timestamps, hence checking the freshness of messages
which includes the keys. Since the secrecy of these keys are not violated, it implies
keys are fresh.
• Unknown-Key Share: Since the entities use their own unique key pair and private keys
SKUEi are not violated, it enforces this requirement. The entities’ ID and generated
hashes prevent this attack. The inclusion of UA and UB in the authentication process
also proves this requirement.
• Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience: Since the entities use their own unique
public/private keys using ECIES, it enforces this requirement. Therefore, knowing one
key in a session is not enough to deduce another. Backward and forward secrecy of
keys are possible; no entity or adversary is capable of computing keys in past session
or predict feature keys, which is due to ECC. Obviously, the public keys are globally
known but the private keys are only known to the owners. However, to compromise
the keys, ECIES, UEA and UEB would have to be compromised at the same time. It
should be noted that compromising the HN during the primary authentication does
not necessarily mean that D2D authentication will be compromised.
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The analysis of the DDACap protocol is similar to that of DDSec, the difference being
the parameters such as IDs, tokens, nonce, hashes and cryptographic primitives used
and the exchanged messages, but the security requirements and security properties are
the same.
7.2. Security Consideration
The UEs using the proposed D2D security protocols will be able to authenticate each
other, share data and delegate their access rights via security tokens in network- and
non-network-assisted D2D communications scenarios. The participating entities use ECC,
whereby solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is not feasible.
Hence, attackers cannot break the proposed protocols’ cryptography, Key Derivation
Function (KDF) and find the secret key if a big size of the binary elliptic curve is used as it
requires very high computational time. The larger is the curve size, the better is the security
level of a protocol. In addition, the use of randomness, hash function, tokens, delegation,
ID and certificate digital signature together with Third Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP)’s 5G security standard recommendations harden the security of the protocols.
The formal analysis proves that the DDSec and DDACap protocols can address
5G-enabled D2D communications security issues as proposed by providing entity au-
thentication, authorization, decentralization, anonymity, scalability, fault tolerance, user
permission delegation, secrecy, data authenticity and integrity during D2D data sharing.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we discuss how 5G will use D2D communications to improve quality of
experience and service for end users and enable MNO to offload traffic from the backhaul
and push content to the edge. This will enable mobile users with their UE to access, cache
and share ProSe and edge content. We explore the related work on 5G-enabled D2D
communications and end users’ role in content distribution and the integration of D2D
communications with CCN to solve the issues of service delivery and traffic offloading.
However, such integrated system lack an efficient and robust multi-purpose security
solution that addresses its security issues. Thus, we propose a D2D security solution that
applies IBE, ECIES and fine-grained access controls for authentication and authorization
procedures. The proposed solution consists of DDSec and DDACap protocols that can
be applied to enable D2D users to cache, share data and delegate their access rights to
other D2D users in different coverage scenarios with or without network assistance. The
proposed protocols were formally verified using formal methods and automated protocol
verifier ProVerif. We also comprehensively analyzed the protocols’ security properties with
two taxonomies. The future work should be on how this solution can be extended to V2V
and IoT.
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